Impacts of Federal and State Hazard Mitigation Policies on Local Land Use Policy
Despite efforts to mitigate adverse impacts of natural disasters, the United States has experienced exponential growth in losses from disasters. Annual property damage has increased geometrically over the last few decades, and the affected communities have risen to historic levels.
i Increases in population, property values, and concentration of assets in hazard-prone areas are primary causes (NRC 2006) . Recent climate studies indicate we should also expect more extreme weather-related events in the future (Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther 2011). The cumulative expected exposure of the U.S. government to catastrophes over the next 75 years could reach $7 trillion (Cummins, Suher, and Zanjani 2010) . Unlike global trends, the United
States has experienced a steady decline in loss of life associated with natural disasters. Yet, the staggering loss of life of over 1,800 people associated with Hurricane Katrina in 2005 has brought this declining trend into question.
Planners and hazard mitigation specialists increasingly emphasize the importance of proactive land use planning focused on avoiding or minimizing loss, rather than simply reacting to a disaster event (Burby et al. 1998 , Peacock et al. 2008 ). The intent is to prevent new development in hazardous areas in the first place, or to ensure that existing structures can be relocated before or after a disaster event. The preventative land use planning approach has been characterized as the most promising long-term solution to mitigate the destructive effects of disasters (NRC 2006) . Communities that invest in planning are more resilient -a critical concept in hazards research -as they are better able to anticipate and adaptively respond to extreme events, to rapidly recovery, and to reduce future vulnerability (Peacock et al. 2008) .
A major obstacle to the preventative approach is the shared governance dilemma where the higher level of government has a strong stake in promoting a policy, but lower governing bodies are unwilling partners (Berke 1997 , May and Williams1986, Smith 2011 . For natural disasters, the federal government bears the brunt of financial loss in disasters as indicated by rising disaster reconstruction costs that are placing ever greater burdens on federal budgets, but local governments are reluctant to pay sufficient attention to prevention. Local officials give low priority to land use as a means for reducing disaster losses given the lack of a public constituency, costs of mitigation are immediate, benefits are long-term and uncertain and may not occur during the tenure of elected officials, and the physical manifestations of improved public safety are not visible (Burby et al. 1999 , Burby 2006 , Mileti 1999 . Further, many hazardous areas such as ocean shorelines, steep slopes, precipices along seismic faults are viewed by landowners and developers as reasonably safe, profitable places for development.
Hence, land use approaches to hazard mitigation can be viewed by economic interests and local governments pursuing economic growth as a threat to be avoided rather than a good to be fostered. The situation worsens prospects for successful implementation of shared governance programs focused on preventative land use planning, since the higher level of governments are motivated to act, but local partners are less willing.
To resolve this dilemma the federal government has taken a more active role in creating shared governance programs aimed at motivating local government action with states acting as key partners in interpreting federal policy and, in turn, effecting local action. Despite the emergence of federal policy experiments, knowledge about the influence of federal policies on local planning is limited. Shared governance implementation studies in the planning field have primarily focused on the role of state mandates on local comprehensive plan quality and plan implementation (e.g., Berke and French 1994 , Brody 2003 , Bunnell and Jepson 2011 , Burby and May 1997 , Dalton and Burby 1994 , Deyle and Smith 1998 , Hoch 2007 , Pendall 2001 .
Systematic evaluations of the effects of federal laws on local plan quality, particularly concerning land use actions, are almost non-existent. The few exceptions provide important initial empirical evidence, but have a key limitation by only focusing on a single national policy (Berke et al. 2006 , Tang et al 2009 . questions will provide insight into addressing the general challenges of intergovernmental implementation that face the nation in attempting to carry out national strategies aimed at reducing vulnerability to natural hazards.
Conceptualizing Local Mitigation Actions, Federal Policy, State Policy and Local Context
The conceptual framework to guide the analysis consists of four dimensions. The first dimension sets forth the characteristics that define preventative land use actions. Dimensions two, three and four constitute federal policy, state policy and implementation efforts, and local context respectively that, in combination, are intended to influence how well local plans support the preventative land use approach.
Preventative Land Use Mitigation
Traditional land use and hazard mitigation programs typically use the same type of planning and implementation actions. (Schwab 2010a) , land use actions that steer post-disaster redevelopment away from hazardous locations (Smith 2011) , and state planning mandates that have led to successful incorporation of hazard mitigation elements into local comprehensive plans (Schwab 2010b) . Despite this progress, local governments lag in successful adoption on preventative land use actions in local plans (Burby and May 1997 , NRC 2006 , Olshansky and Kartez 1998 . In a consensus document of the National Research Council (2006), leading researchers in the human dimensions of disasters concluded that while the quality of local plans in advancing mitigation have improved modestly over the past two decades, the preponderance of evidence suggests local governments and the public place limited importance in discouraging development in hazardous areas (NRC 2006) . In a study of 176 local plans in six states, Burby and May's conclusion over a decade ago is still relevant today, "Like debates on land use more generally, debates about controlling development in hazardous areas often focus on…appropriate uses of land, controls over development, or regulation of construction in hazardous areas making the stakes in these decisions…large, and conflicts…not easily resolved" (1997, p. 22) .
Consequently, other types of mitigation (e.g., structural strengthening of buildings, emergency management, and public information) are more tractable and more frequently relied on as they do not entail difficulties that simultaneously deal with private property rights, environmental protection, and economic development issues (NRC 2006) .
Alternatives for Federal Policy Influence
Over the past two decades various federal laws were enacted to integrate and leverage the capabilities and resources of the federal, state and local levels of government to protect the environment and reduce loss from natural hazards. Sociologist Gunther Teubner (1983) identified this legal framework as "reflexive law" which is designed to build connections among policy sectors, interest groups, resources, and disciplinary knowledge bases that are essential to solving complex societal problems like hazard loss reduction. In contrast to "regulatory law"
that entails the federal government setting explicit standards that control state and local government actions, and applying sanctions for enforcement, reflexive laws impose procedures that guide the process of sub-national action. State and local governments have flexibility to tailor solutions that fit their context to achieve compliance with federal policy. Incentives can be used to induce sub-national governments to continually assess their actions and adjust them over time (hence the reflexivity). A collaborative and communicative approach takes precedence over top-down hierarchical relationships, and governing is viewed as fostering interaction and learning among interested actors (Fiorino 2006 , Nolan 2009 ).
There are two major variants of "reflexive laws" (Nolan 2009 ). The mandate variant requires sub-national action and relies on regulatory sticks to ensure compliance, but still supports intergovernmental collaboration and self-organized action. State and local governments, for example, would be required to achieve a federal hazard mitigation goal, but determination of how to comply is the responsibility of these lower level governments. The voluntary variant relies on carrots with the aim of incentivizing action. Emphasis is placed on state and/or local adoption of mitigation policies that fit their contexts and meet national goals.
As will be discussed, under reflexive policy framework the Disaster Mitigation Act (DMA) represent the mandate variant and the Community Rating System (CRS) represent a combination of the mandate and incentive-based voluntary variants. We would expect that support for preventative land use actions in local mitigation plans to be stronger for plans given credit under CRS.
Alternatives for State Policy Influence
States have a critical role in a reflexive legal system as they adapt to federal law and, in turn, influence local actions (Berke 1997 , Fiorino 2007 , Rabe 2006 . States can offer a rich source of innovation and capabilities in working with local partners to achieve national goals in a reflexive federal policy framework. In contrast, states can also choose to add an additional source of interdependence and complexity which can pose additional challenges to shared governance implementation. In the case of hazard mitigation, the federal government can establish vulnerability reduction goals and programs for reaching those goals, but the detailed implementation of federal policy rests upon actions by states which, in turn, shape local reaction in preparing plans that regulate land use and protect public safety.
iii Thus, state interpretation of a common federal policy can vary widely and lead to diverse outcomes at the local level.
State interpretation of federal policy can range from coercive-top-down approaches to cooperative-flexible approaches aimed at motivating local action (May 1993 , Fioroni 2007 .
Earlier work by various planning scholars examined the effects of state mandates on local comprehensive plans (Berke and French 1994) , and for comparative analyses among intergovernmental programs in international settings, including Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. (May et al. 1996 In sum, the two federal policies and two state mitigation planning programs provide substantial variation in factors that are hypothesized to affect local mitigation plans. The variation between federal policy approaches will allow us not only to compare local plans under the DMA mandate with and without the CRS incentive, but also to compare the influence of the two state programs under each federal policy approach. As noted, the influence of state mandates on local plans has been evaluated in other studies, but the relative impact of states in carrying out the intentions of federal policies has not been examined. This study extends knowledge on how higher level governments influence local plans by simultaneously examining the independent effects of federal and state governments on land use actions adopted in local plans.
The Role of Local Context in Explaining Inclusion of Land Use Policy Actions
Using a prior literature review on studies that predict plan quality studies (Berke and Godschalk 2008) In sum, we expect federal policies and state programs to affect land use policy, but also expect five types of local contextual factors will affect local land use policy. By including all these factors in a multivariate model, we can estimate the relative contribution of each factor, while simultaneously accounting for the effect of the other factors.
Study Design and Data

Sample Selection
The samples of local governments with plans were derived from two separate prior studies that covered coastal counties and municipalities in Florida and North Carolina, including random samples of 43 local governments with stand-alone DMA plans (n=24 in FL; n = 19 in NC) and 28 with DMA plans submitted under the CRS (n= 17 in FL; n = 11 in NC).
iv
Communities with a population of 5,000 people or less were eliminated from the sample, since the large number of such communities would skew representation toward very small places. We also excluded several major metropolitan cities and counties over 750,000 population (Miami, FL) to assure some compatibility in planning capacity and complexity. We focus on coastal local governments because they represent diverse geographic locations and have wide variation in population growth and development rates. Moreover, hazard mitigation through land use management is an especially important planning issue for coastal local governments because coastal areas are especially prone to hazards and tend to experience higher growth rates than the rest of the country (Beatley, Brower and Schwab 2002 and NOAA 2004) .
The state mitigation planning programs were evaluated on the basis of two sources of information. The first involved interviews with the lead state hazard mitigation officer responsible for state and local mitigation (that is, Florida Department of Community Affairs and
North Carolina Division of Emergency Management) to gain information on the extent which each state was devolving authority to plan, offering technical assistance, encouraging local participation, and funding. The second source involved review of agency reports that provided additional insights on the state programs. The sources provided the basis to make judgments in evaluating the comparative strength of mitigation planning programs for each state.
The data for contextual variables were collected from the U.S. census fact sheet, the Public Entity Risk Institute (PERI), and the local mitigation plan documents. For the U.S.
census, population was measured as the number of people in a community in 2000, population growth was calculated by the percentage change in population 10-years prior to plan adoption and date of adoption, and home value was measured by the median home value in 2000. For PERI, disaster experience was measured as the number of presidentially declared disasters 10-years prior to the adoption of the local mitigation plan. For the plan document, planner involvement in plan preparation was measured based on whether or not a local plan identified that a local government land use planner was involved in the plan making process.
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Coding Protocol and Procedures
The two samples of plans were utilized to identify the number of policies for preventative land use category plus four additional categories of mitigation activities (structural protection of property, emergency services, information and awareness, and structural protection of infrastructure) established by FEMA. A coding protocol was developed based on coding items that serve as the recording unit for our data. The items were selected to identify mitigation actions within each of the five categories of activities that could be included in the local mitigation plans (see table 2 ). Each item was measured on a 0 to 1 binary scale with 0 denoting that the item in question was not included and 1 denoted that the item was present.
( Table 2 here)
Multiple rounds of testing the coding protocol on plans outside the study area were Each local mitigation plan was content analyzed by two of seven coders on the coding team who independently coded each plan. Rules were developed by the research team to ensure that all coders interpreted the items as consistently as possible. We systematically varied pairings of coders. This tactic minimized the potential for inter-coder dynamics which could reduce reliability, such as deference of one coder to another during the reconciliation process whereby the coders reviewed each difference in measurement and rechecked the plan document to determine which code was accurate. Rules were developed by the coding team to ensure that coders interpreted the items as consistently as possible. In cases when there are differences between coders for the double coded plans, the coders reconciled each difference to achieve agreement in measurement by rechecking the plan to determine which code was accurate. Our overall reliability score was 88% for the DMA stand-alone plans and 89% for CRS-credited plans that were calculated from the double-coded data before the reconciliation process. vi Our inter-coder agreement scores are acceptable compared to scores reported in the plan quality literature which range between 70% and 97% (Berke and Godschalk 2008) .
Computation and Analytical Procedures
Mean percentages for each of the five categories of mitigation actions (land use, structural of private property, emergency services, informational, and structural protection of infrastructure) across federal policies and state programs were calculated based on the sum of actions (figure 1). Mean percentages were also calculated for each of the 14 preventative land use actions (table 3) . Individual scores for the 71 local plans based on the sum of land use actions included in each plan are shown in the appendix (see table A-1). Poisson regressions using dummy variables were used to test for differences in the number of preventative actions adopted in the plans in response to alternative federal policies controlling for state policies and local contextual factors (figure 1, tables 4 and 5). Poisson models treat each possible action as being equally important and all the actions as independent of each other. A quasi-Poisson model was run for the Poisson models and none of the dispersion parameters were substantially greater than 1.00. Thus, over-dispersion was not a problem.
Overview of Federal Hazard Mitigation Policies
The Disaster Mitigation Act (DMA) was passed in 2000 by Congress in response to rising disaster losses in the U.S., a desire to take a more proactive approach, more effectively and efficiently distribute federal mitigation funds, and respond to questions about the efficacy of existing mitigation programs Burby et al. 1999; Birkland 2006; Smith 2009 ).
vii The DMA provides a framework of federal, state, and local cooperation needed to achieve a comprehensive and integrated approach to hazard mitigation (Nolan 2009 The Community Rating System (CRS) was established in 1990 as an incentive-based voluntary program designed to entice better local floodplain mitigation efforts. The incentive entails federally backed insurance premium rate reductions for property owners that reflect of the level of local government mitigation effort under four categories of activities, including public information, mapping and regulatory, damage reduction, and emergency preparedness. As credits are accumulated, a community CRS rating improves and local policyholders rates are reduced.
One activity under the damage reduction category gives credits to those local governments that prepare and implement a comprehensive flood mitigation plan. Under this activity, the CRS credits communities for developing a flood mitigation plan following a standardized planning process that is consistent with the regulations established by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.
For this study, we focus on the policy element of these plans. The greater the number of mitigation policy actions included in a local plan, the greater the insurance rate reduction credits are assigned to a locality.
Communities are allowed to submit multi-hazard mitigation plans prepared under DMA to obtain CRS credit or they can submit a stand-alone flood mitigation plan. Communities almost always chose the multi-hazard option to take advantage of coordinating flood mitigation with mitigation activities linked to other hazards. Thus, CRS-credited plans are prepared within the DMA intergovernmental framework must meet both program requirements to be eligible for the incentive. (For the remainder of this paper, we refer to DMA plans that receive CRS credit as CRS-credited plans, and plans without credit as DMA plans.) 
Overview of State Policy Response
Findings on Mitigation Priorities, Federal and State Policy, and Local Factors
Is Land Use a Priority?
The first step in our analysis focused on the degree to which local government hazard mitigation plans give attention to land use actions compared to other types of polices. Figure 1 compares the means of the percent of all possible actions that were included in the plans for each of the five categories of mitigation actions. Scores for all plans were pooled since the pattern of findings were consistent across federal and state policies. This analysis permits us to answer our first research question concerning the extent of support in local mitigation plans for preventative land use policies compared to other policies.
Findings clearly indicate that local plans give less attention to preventative land use policies than other policies. As a result, local mitigation plans fail to provide a platform for guiding new urban growth to locations outside of current and forecasted hazard areas, assisting property owners to relocate homes and commercial buildings to safer sites, and managing post-disaster redevelopment in ways that reduce future risk. Rather emphasis is placed on easier to achieve activities (e.g., emergency services, public information campaigns, and structural protection of in-situ development) that avoid property rights issues, do not threaten economic interests, and do not generate political opposition.
Do Federal and State Policies Make a Difference?
The next analysis addresses the question of whether federal policies and states have an influence on the degree to which local mitigation plans incorporate preventative land use policies. Table 4 compares the differences in mean percentages of 14 land use policies and overall mean difference of all possible policies that were included in the plans between federal policies in each state, and between states under each federal policy.
( Table 4 here)
The In contrast, the overall mean difference in percentage of total possible land use policies was significantly greater for North Carolina plans than Florida plans for both the CRS-credited plans (12.7%, p < .001) and DMA plans (20.7%, p < .001). More traditional development regulations had the greatest differences for CRS-credited plans in North Carolina including subdivision design codes (73% more) and zoning (49% more), and DMA plans in North Carolina including subdivision design codes (84% more), zoning (64% more), and hazard area setback requirements (38% more). Major differences extend beyond traditional regulations under DMA, as the difference was greater for North Carolina plans for property acquisition (32% more) and siting of public facilities (29% more). xii These findings indicate that the design of state planning programs has a significant influence on use of preventative land use actions.
These findings allow us to answer the second and third questions concerning the influence are federal policies on local plan support of land use actions controlling for state policy, and the influence of state policies on local plan support for land use actions controlling for federal policy. First, reliance on land use activities under the incentive-based CRS-credited plans was not significantly greater than local DMA mitigation plans in both states. A potential interpretation of this result is related to a weak incentive structure for creating a mitigation plan that includes preventative land use actions. A CRS plan can only receive a maximum of 294 credits out of a possible 4,500 credits as credits are also given for a range of non-planning actions that focus on adoption of individual mitigation actions. A community receives a 5% insurance rate reduction for each additional 500 credits up to a maximum of 45%. As a result, even a high scoring plan may not achieve enough credits to achieve the 5% reduction threshold.
Further, inclusion of preventative land use actions in plans are given the same weight as other policy actions as local governments can choose any combination of actions under the five categories of mitigation actions (see figure 1) with each combination receiving an equivalent maximum of 70 credits (e.g., emergency services, public awareness and preventative land use actions receive equivalent credit). Thus, while the overarching conclusion of the shared governance literature is that policy instruments that bind rewards to performance encourage greater effort (Prendergast 1999) , incentive schemes have been found to have limited or no influence on effort if rewards are too small or too discrete (e.g., Zahran et al. 2010 ).
Second, state policy targeted at local government plans made a significant difference.
Not only do states make a significant difference, but that the design of a state policy and implementation program makes a difference. This suggests that the more flexible and broader approach used by North Carolina motivated local governments to embrace land use actions. The narrower and more prescriptive approach taken by Florida may have induced local governments to avoid more comprehensive, integrated and potentially controversial mitigation solutions that are required in the land use planning arena.
The Role of Local Factors
Multivariate Poisson regression analysis indicates which factors, including federal policies, state policies, and local contextual variables, significantly influence the number of land use actions incorporated in plans (see table 5 ). We tested two regression equations by sequentially adding the federal policy variable (column 1) and state policy variable (column 2) to the set of local contextual variables to examine their effects on number of actions included in plans.
( Table 5) Several key findings were derived from the regression analyses. First, federal policy does not make a difference. The presence of a CRS credit incentive to reduce property owner flood insurance premiums does not induce a more robust set of land use actions used in plans.
As noted, the lack of explanatory power of CRS incentives is likely due to the weak incentive structure for creating a mitigation plan that emphasizes preventative land use actions. Second, state programs and policy guidance substitute for rather than add to the influence of local factors.
The influence of federal policy independent of state policy (column 1) indicates that two local factors had a significant influence on land use actions, disaster frequency and presence of local planners involved in plan development, but these factors were insignificant and replaced by the presence of state policy (column 2). Third, there are significant differences in the strength of state policy (column 2). North Carolina's bottom-up, flexible and integrated approach to local plan making had a significant positive influence. In contrast, Florida's top-down and prescriptive approach backed by more punitive actions for non-compliance negatively affected use of land use actions.
Let us further interpret these findings. Two indicators of local planning capacity to support planning were used. Population size as an indicator of greater resources for planning was an insignificant factor in explaining use of preventative land use actions. xiii Participation of a planner from the local planning department was a significant predictor of inclusion of land use actions in mitigation plans, but had no effect when state policy is included in the regression model. Local planners take a more forward-looking approach that embraces the tenets of land use planning relative to other local officials who may lead local mitigation planning efforts (e.g., emergency managers give attention to evacuation, sheltering, and warning, and stormwater engineers focus on identification of at-risk structures and enhancement of building codes).
However, it is conceivable that state policy substitutes for the presence of local planners in focusing attention on preventative land use actions or that it drives whether or not local planners are involved in the planning process or not.
Previous research suggests as population growth rates increase the importance of land use planning as a means to reduce social, economic, and environmental impacts of growth will increase (Manta Conroy and Berke 2004, Norton 2005) However, the lack of explanatory power of population growth rate was unexpected. These findings probably suggests that the heightened salience of land use planning in general in places that are experiencing rapid growth have limited influence, at least for hazard mitigation.
An indicator of human capital, median home value (or wealth), was unexpectedly an insignificant predictor of the number of land use actions. While the common argument has been that wealth reflects an ability to fund planning and a wider array of land use activities, it also suggests the existence of environmental groups that can help formulate development-limiting policies and adequate local resources to reduce the need for increasing tax base through additional hazard area development. Thus wealthy communities are more likely to be antigrowth, and supportive of land use actions that control growth (Berke et al. 1996, Burby and Dalton 1994) . However, it is likely that state policy replaces the need for community wealth in preventative land use efforts as local governments may follow state policy regardless of whether they have locally derived resources and support for land use actions.
Past research suggests that increased frequency of losses serve as focusing events that catalyze public attention to disaster which translates to greater attention to land use (Brody 2003 , Burby 2003 . Unexpectedly, the degree of repeated losses had a significant negative influence on inclusion of preventative land use actions in hazard mitigation plans. It could be that increased repetition of disaster losses may raise salience and support for visible and immediate actions like emergency management and structural protection, but does not motivate land use actions that are often associated with greater obstacles associated with property rights and economic development (NRC 2006) . However, disaster frequency had no effect when state policy was included in the regression model. It is conceivable that state policy replaces the effect of focusing events as local governments are directed to place emphasis on preventative land use actions.
Discussion: Challenges to Overcoming the Shared Governance Dilemma
Our analysis of 71 local mitigation plans offers several findings on local priority of land use planning for reducing vulnerability, and the role of reflexive federal policy approaches in creating plans that promote preventative land use actions, while accounting for state policy and local factors. Caution should be used in interpreting our findings given the small sample sizes, and restricted coverage of only two states. We cannot say that planners and policy makers should generalize broadly from our results, but the findings provide a basis for future studies aimed at improving knowledge of how federal policy influences local mitigation actions, and formulating initial policy recommendations.
One finding is that land use actions are given low priority by local mitigation plans produced under the DMA (both CRS-credited and non-credited plans) compared to other mitigation activities that are less effective in vulnerability reduction and politically easier to achieve. The emphasis placed on the identification of discrete hazard mitigation projects, particularly in Florida, are also indicative of a planning process driven by federal grant programs that disproportionately fund single mitigation projects, perhaps resulting in strong emphasis on plans that identify these projects rather than simultaneously adopting a more future-oriented, land use-focused plan. The findings reflect the difficulties of the shared governance dilemma for use of land use actions in plans. Despite the strong motivation to act at the federal level due to the rising costs to federal governments in disaster outlays, local governments place low priority on land use actions and instead emphasize less tangible and easier to achieve activities, especially mitigation projects that are subsidized by the federal government.
A second finding is that the federal incentive scheme under the CRS does not strengthen A fourth finding suggests that state action does not guarantee support for land use initiatives. Use of land use actions showed significant variation between Florida and North Carolina. It is conceivable that North Carolina's more devolved, flexible and integrated approach motivated local governments to embrace land use actions. Florida's more top-down, prescriptive, and narrow project approach may have induced local governments to avoid more comprehensive and integrated mitigation solutions that are more prevalent in the land use planning arena compared to other policy areas, notably emergency services. Further, the reliance on a project-by-project approach could be explained by Florida's more coercive sanctions as local governments are reluctant to risk non-compliance.
Policy Recommendations
Given the increasing buildup of development in hazardous locations and the likelihood that catastrophic losses from extreme events are on the rise, the nation must come to grips with reversing this trend. This means overcoming the shared governance dilemma. While land use approaches offer a fundamental solution to reduce the threat and reducing federal disaster outlays, federal policy under the Disaster Mitigation Act and the National Flood Insurance
Program's Community Rating System need major improvements. We offer the following set of tentative recommendations.
The DMA needs to include a stronger set of requirements aimed at the preventative land use approach to local mitigation planning. To be eligible for mitigation funds our proposed new requirements should stipulate that all local mitigation plans include a land use element. It would address pre-disaster land use actions aimed at limiting future growth in known hazard areas, and guide post-disaster recovery to take advantage of opportunities created by a disaster event to steer rebuilding away from hazard areas. The category of emergency services should not be included as a mitigation action and thus be excluded from consideration under DMA. Emergency services are critical for supporting effective warning, evacuating and sheltering at-risk populations once a disaster event occurs, but they not address long-term solutions to avoid or at-least limit at-risk populations and built environments in hazard areas.
Strengthen the incentives in the CRS for local mitigation plans and land use actions.
Incentives for planning that support land use actions should be increased in several ways. First, more insurance rate reduction credits should be given to local governments for creating a local mitigation plan. As noted, the current incentive structure only assigns only 294 credits out of a possible 4,500 credits for mitigation planning. The allocation limits prospects for integration and coordination required by land use actions and encourages a more fragmented and individual project approach to mitigation. Second, preventative land use actions within each plan should be given more weight in assigning credits than other categories of actions. Given the escalating trend in buildup of urban development in hazardous locations through the U.S., land use policy solutions are increasingly becoming a more essential tool in reducing risk. Third, local governments should be given substantial credit for coordinating actions in local mitigation plans with local comprehensive plans. Prior research has shown that when mitigation efforts are integrated into well-established and ingoing local comprehensive planning efforts, insured losses form hazards significantly decline (Burby 2006) . 2) zoning, 3)density bonuses, 4) density transfer Range: 0 --9 provisions, 5) cluster development, 6) setbacks or buffer zones, 7) site review, 8) subdivision regulation, 9) tax abatement, 10) site public facilities, 11) post--disaster land use change, 12) post--disaster capital improvements adjustment, 13) special study/impact fee assessment, 14) hazards included in land suitability analysis.
Structural Protection of
Count based on the number of six structural Content analysis Property Actions protection of property actions: 1) building codes, of local plans Mean: 2.0 2) freeboard requirement, 3) elevation, St. Dev.: 1.4 4) retrofit of existing public facilities, Range: 0 to 5 5) adjustment of public infrastructure, and 6) post disaster building design change.
Emergency Services Actions
Count based on the number of six emergency Content analysis Mean: 3.1 services actions: 1) emergency response of local plans St. Dev.: 1.7 capability, 2) communications and utilities, Range: 0 to 6 3) evacuation, 4) sheltering, 5) emergency plans, 6) disaster warning.
Information and Awareness
Count based on the number of four public (Brody et al. 2007 ).
ii Tang et al (2009) investigated how well local plans in five states comply with goals of National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, and Berke et al. (2006) examined how well local plans conform with a single national planning mandate in New Zealand, but both studies did not conduct a comparative assessment of alternative policies at the national level. Further, these studies have not explored how states interpret and apply federal law to influence local planning.
iii The federal government's direct control is limited to activities that affect federal facilities or lands, including such activities as preparedness planning for federal facilities or instituting building regulations for the construction of federal facilities.
iv As noted, two randomly selected samples of coastal communities (counties and municipalities) that prepared local mitigation plans from two separate studies were used for the study reported here: communities with CRS credited plans under DMA and communities with stand-alone DMA plans that did not receive CRS credit. We used the definition of coastal included in the Coastal Zone Management Act. For the CRS study, the CRS credited plans were proportionately sampled in accordance to the number of CRS plans by state from a national population of 341 communities that prepared CRS credited plans. A total of 60 CRS credited plans were randomly selected from the national population. For the DMA study, 30 communities were randomly selected in each state (Florida and North Carolina). There was overlap between the two samples. In Florida, 6 communities in the DMA sample had CRS credited plans, and the CRS sample included an additional 11 communities. In North Carolina, 11 communities in the DMA sample had CRS credited plans, but the CRS sample did not include additional communities. Thus, the overall samples for each state are: Florida included 17 communities with CRS credited plans and 24 stand-alone DMA plans; and North Carolina included 11 communities with CRS credited plans and 19 communities with Stand-alone DMA plans.
v Many of the plans assessed are multi-jurisdictional. A community was counted as having a planner only if the planner from that specific community was on the official planning committee or team.
vi Due to limited resources for the CRS data, every fifth plan was content analyzed by two coders on the coding team who independently coded each plan. The remaining 23 plans were coded by a single coder. vii In fact, the Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council found that "a dollar spent on mitigation saves society an average of $4" using FEMA data from 1993 to 2003 (Godschalk et al. 2009 ).
viii Two key sources of funds for state and local governments are the Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) (FEMA 2004) . The nationally competitive PDM grant program allows states and local governments to apply for hazard mitigation funding to address pre-identified projects rather than wait for a federal disaster declaration to receive HMGP funds. Since HMGP funds are predicated on 15% of federal disaster expenditures, these funds can be significant following a major event, reaching up to and sometimes exceeding hundreds of millions of dollars.
ix Florida has a major commitment in local funding for local plan preparation and implementation through the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund which supports multiple initiatives, including, for example, the $10 million annual fund under the Residential Construction Mitigation Program, $7 million allocated for hazard retrofit projects, outreach and education, and building code-related efforts, and $3 million for retrofit state evacuation shelters.
x The State of North Carolina emphasizes pre-and post-disaster state-level hazard mitigation programs, both of which were initially triggered by special legislative appropriations following Hurricane Floyd and later codified under Senate Bill 300. The programs include the provision of the state match for federal hazard mitigation grant program (HMGP), the creation of the State Acquisition and Relocation Fund (SARF), and $30 million to create the North Carolina Floodplain Mapping initiative (NCFPM). The State Acquisition and Relocation Fund provides up to $75,000 in state money to each low-income household participating in the relocation of flood-prone housing under the HMGP as a financial incentive to move out of the floodplain as the HMGP can only provide pre-disaster fair market value for the structure.
xi Because many of the individual land use actions listed on table 4 were not included in Florida and North Carolina plans there was no differences. Thus, statistical tests of difference could not be preformed. We only performed a statistical test for the overall mean differences for all possible land use policy actions rather than for each individual action.
xii See endnote 8. xiii This finding on population size is consistent with some studies (Burby 2003) , but other studies found it to be an insignificant predictor (Berke et al. 1999, Burby and Dalton 1994) .
